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Abstract
Least-Unmatched Price Auctions have become a popular format of TV and radio shows. In-
creasingly, they are also applied in internet trading. In these auctions the lowest single (unique)
bid wins. We analyze the game-theoretic solution of least unmatched price auctions when prize,
bidding cost and the number of participants are known. We use a large data-set of such auc-
tions in order to contrast actual behavior of players with game-theoretic predictions. In the
aggregate, bidding behaviour seems to conform with a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
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EEA conference in Budapest in 2007 under the title "Least Unmatched Price Auctions".1 Introduction
In standard auctions, the highest bid wins. English auctions and ﬁrst- and second-price
sealed-bid auctions are prime examples. Recently, new forms of auctions based on the opposite
principle became popular in diﬀerent areas. In "reverse auctions" or "backward auctions", as
they are sometimes called, the lowest bid wins. Without further restrictions this rule would sim-
ply induce all bidders to bunch on the lowest price. The additional rule that only an unmatched
(single) bid can win, however, forces participants to predict the bids of other participants. It
is this prediction problem, which makes the Least-Unmatched Price Auction (LUPA1) worth
studying from a strategic point of view.
According to a report in USA Today (25th of October 2006), prizes worth $360,000 were
won by bids totalling less than $1,000 in the ﬁrst 250 LUPAs run in the USA . The UK-based
company Auction Air Ltd. organized more than 500 LUPAs. Since fall 2004, it allocated prizes
totalling more than $700,000 to winning bids worth about $12,000. Least Unmatched Price
Auctions may appear an odd trading mechanism. Indeed, they are often used as a marketing
instrument for TV- and radio shows. In fall 2005, when fuel prices sky-rocketed, the German
radio station Radio Brocken sold petrol vouchers worth €500 in a daily LUPA. Also in 2004, the
London radio station Capital FM Radio sold a ﬂat in London, a house in Spain, and a Bentley
Continental in several LUPAs. Several other LUPAs were run on German radio and television
in 2005-06.
In recent years, game shows on radio and television have become a fascinating area of
economic research. The data of some shows has been used for the analysis of the participants’
behavior. Already in 1993, G￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1993) analyzed a game show called "Card Sharks".
More recently, H￿￿￿￿￿￿, L￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ W￿￿￿￿￿ (2005) and P￿￿￿ ￿￿. ￿￿ (2006) studied such
popular TV shows as "Who Wants to be a Millionaire?" and "Deal or No Deal?". Data from
these shows allow these authors to investigate whether participants’ behavior was consistent
with the economic notion of rationality and the degree of risk-aversion. Analyzing the show
"The Price Is Right", B￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿. (1996) conclude that behavior of contestants is not fully
rational, whilst T￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ C￿￿￿￿ (2002) come to the opposite conclusion that contestants
are quite capable of making optimal decisions even in diﬃcult situations.
In the game show "Jeopardy!", players choose the category and diﬃculty of questions in
1 One can also read this acronym as "lowest unique price auction".
2order to maximize their own chances for giving the right answer while making it more diﬃcult
for their rivals. With data from this show M￿￿￿￿!￿ (1995) and B￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ S#￿$￿￿￿ (2006)
can highlight behavioral aspects of decision-making. A￿￿￿￿￿&￿!￿, A￿!￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿, W￿￿￿#
(2005) study "The Weakest Link", a game show in which players gain money for a coalition
by answering questions and secure these gains for themselves by voting to exclude other players
from the coalition, in order to address the issues of gender discrimination. While chance plays
an important role in all the games mentioned so far, B￿￿!#-D￿)￿￿￿!# ￿￿ ￿￿. (2002) study
beauty contests, organized through newspapers, which are purely strategic games.
Game shows provide natural experiments for studying the behavior of large numbers of
participants. Moreover, they often involve high gains and, thus, oﬀer stronger incentives. Similar
to internet auctions such as Ebay and Amazon, which were studied by O!￿￿￿+￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ R￿￿#
(2002, 2006) and others, radio and TV shows are also ﬁeld experiments (L-!￿￿￿.-R￿￿￿￿￿
1999). Thus, they meet two major points of critique advanced against laboratory experiments:
small prizes and small numbers of participants. B￿￿!#-D￿)￿￿￿!# ￿￿ ￿￿. (2002) compare
beauty contest experiments conducted in laboratory settings with those run in newspapers.
Their studies suggest that some behavioral patterns observed in laboratory experiments with
small numbers of participants may disappear in ﬁeld experiments with larger pools of players.
On the other hand, T￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ C￿￿￿￿ (2002) can replicate the results obtained in a ﬁeld
experiment on TV in a laboratory experiment. They show that the behavior of people in natural
experiments with large stakes may not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from behavior observed in laboratory
experiments with much smaller monetary stakes.
LUPAs are a special case of unmatched bid auctions which have been studied also by
other authors. D￿ W￿!#￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ N￿￿)￿￿ (2006) run laboratory experiments with "minbid
auctions". They consider the case where players are restricted to only one bid and compare the
results from their laboratory experiment with a Monte Carlo simulation. R￿$$￿$￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿.
(2007) consider high and low "unique bid auctions" where bidders are also restricted to a single
bid. They provide a numerical approximation of the solution for a game-theoretic model and
compare it with the results of a laboratory experiment. Ö￿￿￿￿￿., ￿￿ ￿￿. (2007) run a "lowest
unique positive integer" experiment and contrast the observed behavior with the solution of a
Poisson game with a single bid per player.
The LUPAs which we study in this paper are ﬁeld experiments with mostly large prizes
involving large numbers of participants (sometimes tens and hundreds of thousands). In some
cases we have a relatively small number of participants (one or two hundreds players ), in
3others there is a ﬁve hundred times larger number of participants. Prizes in these LUPAs
vary from $200 to $500,000. These LUPAs have been run under a variety of conditions and in
several countries, providing us with an opportunity to verify the robustness of our theoretical
predictions. Moreover, for some of these LUPAs we have obtained a detailed data at the micro-
level2. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other examples of experiments with such
large numbers of participants and such large stakes.
In this paper, we model LUPAs as non-cooperative games where, as in the ﬁeld experi-
ments, players can place multiple bids. We show that large LUPAs have no equilibrium in pure
strategies. We use the data from several LUPAs to characterize the symmetric equilibrium in
mixed strategies. For the LUPAs with a large number of players, we ﬁnd that aggregate bid-
ding is well described by a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Individual bidders,
however, almost never follow the equilibrium strategy. Consistent with the theoretical result,
people tend to place lower bids more frequently than higher bids. Yet the actual frequency of
low bids is higher than theoretically predicted. We also ﬁnd that the actual number of active
participants in LUPAs is much higher than predicted by the game-theoretic model.
In Section 2 we describe the game. The Nash equilibrium is discussed in Section 3 and,
in Section 4, we present the data from several least unmatched price auctions with varying
number of players, prizes and bidding costs. We conclude with a discussion of our results and
some comments about further research.
2 Least unmatched price auctions
The rules of a least unmatched price auction are as follows. The organizer of the game
announces the item to be sold, and the period within which bidding may take place (bidding
phase). Bids must be submitted in local currency, say in euros and cents. Bids in non-integer
amounts of euros and cents are not accepted. Agents who wish to take part in the game, place
their bids via a phone call or an SMS. The number of bids which an agent can submit is not
restricted. For each bid a ﬁxed cost is charged, which is included in the cost of calling or sending
an SMS. No information about bids is provided during the bidding phase of the game.
As soon as the bidding phase is over, the winner is determined from the set of valid bids
submitted. The winning bid must satisfy two criteria:
2 In these cases, we gratefully acknowledge the support of Legion Telekommunkation GmbH and
Radio Regenbogen.
41. It must be unmatched, i.e. there is no other player who has placed the same bid.
2. It must be the lowest bid among all unmatched bids.
The winner is the player, who made the winning bid. The winner pays the winning bid
to the auctioneer and receives the prize.
Table 1 summarizes some information about LUPAs, which took place in Germany in 2005-
2006. They had diﬀerent formats and were run on radio, TV and in newspapers. Participants
could bid through diﬀerent channels: SMS, phone call, internet, or voucher. In all auctions,
providers charged bidders with 0,49 cents per bid. The auctions had ﬁxed duration and a
variable number of bidders, both shown in the table. There was no restriction on the number









monetary 0,49€ 9400 47872 19 days 14,55€
Radio
10000€
monetary 0,49€ 10660 52847 8 days 14,65€
Radio 1000€
monetary 0,49€ 537 1798 2 days 0,60€
Radio
3000€
monetary 0,49€ 916 6732 4 days 5,82€
Radio
5000€
monetary 0,49€ 631 6201 5 days 11,16€
Newspaper 1099€
mountain bike 0,49€ 437 1272 17 days 1,51€
TV
20 000€
tuned car 0,49€ 89862 266824 7 days 20,65€
Radio 350 000€
House 0,49€ 72588 610104 23 days 99,82€
Table 1. Summary of some LUPAs run in Germany in 2005-2006
Table 2 summarizes data from some recent LUPAs organized by AuctionAirTM. All auc-
tions were run online: costs were charged to the participant’s credit card after online registration.
In all auctions a maximal number of bidders was speciﬁed (see "Bids required" in the table).
Once this number was reached, the auction was closed. Therefore, the duration of the auction
was unknown for participants, though they were informed about the number of bidders. Auc-
tions were repeated: the same item was auctioned oﬀ several times under the same conditions.
We indicate the number of preceding auctions in the table. Data from preceding auctions was
available to bidders. The table provides also the winning bids of the last auction. Bidders were
restricted in the number of bids they could place (see "Max bids per pers."). This constraint
5was, however, mostly not binding. Identiﬁcation of a player was made by the credit card num-
ber. Hence, using several cards or building up coalitions of bidders (e.g. family members), the









80 GB iPod £3.00 120 10 6 £24.00
£1,695
40" LCD TV £4.00 575 20 28 £6.00
£5,900
7 nights in Mauritius £12.00 530 20 2 £49.00
£275
Headphones £5.00 60 5 39 £12.00
£16,900
Mini Cooper £25.00 945 20 11 £20.00
Table 2. Summary of some recent LUPAs run by AuctionAir.com
2.1 Formal description
Let us denote by I = {1,..,N} the set of potential bidders. We will assume that bids are
denominated in cents, i.e., a bid of $12.34 corresponds to the number 1234, etc. Hence, we
can identify the set of bids with the set of natural numbers N. During the bidding phase, each
player i can place an arbitrary number of bids bi ∈ N. There exists a bidding cost of c cents per
bid. If player i wins, he obtains the prize. We denote the value of the prize by A. Though a
participant could make bids sequentially, we can treat his strategy si as the simultaneous choice






, provided that no information about other participants’ behavior
is released during the bidding phase. Let s0 = {∅} denote the outside option of not bidding at
all. The following result follows from the fact that the best possible outcome for player i is to
win A with a single bid bi, at cost c.
Proposition 2.1 Any strategy si containing bid bi > A − c is strictly dominated by strategy
s0.
Without loss of generality, this result allows us to restrict the set of bids to an interval
of natural numbers b = 1..b, with b = A − c. Any pure strategy can be represented by a
binary vector, e.g. (1,0,0,1,0..,0) with "1" at position b meaning that the player places bid b,
and "0" meaning that bid b is not placed according to this strategy. Since bids b are ordered
as natural numbers, the representation of each pure strategy is unique. Each pure strategy st
may be assigned number ν
￿
st￿
= t such that the reverse binary representation of this number
6corresponds to the unique combination of zeros and ones in that strategy. Pure strategy s0
corresponds to the option of not entering the game. Pure strategy s1 has the form (1,0,0..0)
and corresponds to only placing bid b = 1. Pure strategy s5 has the form (1,0,1,0..0) and
corresponds to placing two bids: b = 1 and b = 3. One can view the strategy sν = (1,1,1,0..0)
as the reverse of the binary number 0..0111, which corresponds to the number 7 in the decimal
system and denote this strategy bys s7. It is easy to check that there are in total 2b pure
strategies in the strategy set of each player Si =
￿
st￿2b−1
t=0 , including strategy s0. For any bid
b and any strategy si = st, we write si (b) = st (b) for the binary number associated with b in
strategy st, which equals one if this bid b is placed and or zero otherwise.
Denote with S =
￿
i∈I
Si the set of all possible strategy combinations. Given a combination
s = (s1,s2,..sN) of pure strategies si ∈ S for all players i = 1..N, the winning bid of the LUPA
is determined.









sj (k) ￿= 1, ∀k < b.
The ﬁrst condition means that bid b is unmatched, i.e., only one player places b in the
given strategy combination. The second condition means that there are no unmatched bids
k smaller than b, i.e., each bid k < b is placed either more than once or not placed at all.





A − µ(s) − c
b ￿
k=1











If player i plays si = s0 then pi(s0,s−i) = 0 for all strategy combinations of his rivals s−i. In
our notation, we use theconvention of splitting a strategy combination s into strategy si ∈ Si
played by player i and the opponents’ strategy combination, s−i ∈ S−i = S \ Si. Note that
each player can guarantee himself a payoﬀ of zero by not participating in the game, i.e., by
choosing si = s0. This fact has been used above for the elimination of dominated strategies.
7This completes the description of the LUPAs as a game in strategic form.
2.2 Nash equilibria


















, ∀si ∈ Si.
Our ﬁrst result shows that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists only if bidding costs c
are high relative to the prize A.




i = s0 for all i ∈ I.




i = s0 for all i ∈ I and,
— for any i = 1,...,N, (s∗
1,...,s∗
N) with s∗
i = s1 and s∗
j = s0 for j ￿= i.
3. For c ∈
￿A
2 − 1;A − 1
￿
, there are N Nash equilibria in pure strategies:
for any i = 1,...,N, (s∗
1,...,s∗
N) with s∗
i = s1 and s∗
j = s0 for j ￿= i.
4. For c < A
2 − 1, there exist no Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
The most interesting case is the one with low bidding cost. In all LUPAs which were
played the bidding cost c was very small compared to the prize A. Hence, condition c < A
2 −1 is
met and no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Since the number of strategies in each player’s
strategy set Si is ﬁnite, existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies follows immediately
from Nash’s theorem (N￿￿# 1950)
2.3 Mixed strategies and expected payoﬀ










probability of his playing strategy st. Consider a combination π of such mixed strategies for all





















8The second term determines the expected costs of player i, and the ﬁrst one his expected
prize.



































(1 − sh (l))

. (5)
The Boolean functions ρ(s,k) and ψ(s,k) in representation (3) determine whether bid k
is unmatched in strategy combination s (function ρ(s,k), equation 4) and whether there are no
unmatched bids below k (function ψ(s,k), equation 5).
3 Equilibrium
D￿ W￿!#￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ N￿￿)￿￿ (2006), R￿$$￿$￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿. (2007) and Ö￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿ ￿￿.
(2007) assume that players can only place a single bid. This is equivalent to restricting the




⊂ S. This implies that players have no "no entry"
option, i.e., not to bid at all. With this assumption the analysis of the game becomes very
complicated and no closed-form solution has been suggested so far. In the approach suggested
in this paper, multiple bids are feasible and there is the option of not participating in the
bidding. These assumptions are not only a better description of the LUPAs as they were played
in the ﬁeld experiments, but we can also show that there is a closed-form solution, at least for
a special case.
We consider only symmetric equilibria with π∗






In a ﬁrst step, we ﬁnd an explicit solution for a LUPA in which only strategies of a special
form can be played. In a second step, we discuss the intuition behind such a reduction of the
strategy set and show that this constraint is not always binding. In a third step, we give some
numerical examples.
Proposition 3.1 Consider a LUPA with prize A, bidding cost c and N players. Let players’













A−(m+1) > 1, and
πt∗ =

      












A−(m+1) if t = 2k − 1,







A−(m+1) if t = 2M − 1
0 otherwise
(6)
is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.





 can be played. This allows us to simplify the derivation of the probability that
player i wins with a bid b, i.e.,the probability that bid b is unmatched minus the probability
that this player wins with a lower bid. There is no chance that any other player wins with a
lower bid. This reasoning is the central argument in the proof that leads to the explicit formula
(6).
The examples below show that the class of LUPAs for which (6) is an unconstrained Nash
equilibrium, is non-empty. On the other hand, there exist LUPAs, for which condition s ∈ ￿ S
is binding. Therefore, a restrictions of the strategy set to ￿ S does not lead to a general Nash
equilibrium but represents a constrained approximation of it. The extension of the constrained
Nash equilibrium to the unconstrained case is left for future research.
Example 3.1 Consider a LUPA with two players, N = 2, a prize A = 4 and bidding costs
c = 1. This yields the following payoﬀ matrix where only the payoﬀs of the row player R are
shown:
R \ C s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
s0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s1 2 −1 2 −1 2 −1 2 −1
s2 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1
s3 1 0 1 −2 1 0 1 −2
s4 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
s5 1 −1 1 −2 1 −2 1 −2
s6 0 −2 −1 −2 0 −2 −2 −2
s7 0 −1 0 −2 0 −1 0 −3
In this example, we have restricted the set of bids to {1,2,3}, since bidding 4 is dominated







. Two families of asymmetric equilibria include one player playing a pure
strategy: π∗
i = (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) and the other the strategy π∗





, i = R,C. Notice that condition c < A
2 −1 of proposition 2.2 is violated. The same




Following example illustrates how the equilibrium changes, if the number of players in-
creases from two to three.
Example 3.2 Consider the same LUPA as above (with prize A = 4, and bidding cost c = 1)
















π3 = 1 − π0 − π1 − π2 ≈ 0.087129.
Again, only the pure strategies s0, s1 and s3 are played in equilibrium. All other strategies are
played with probability zero.
Increasing the number of players further reveals a change in the equilibrium structure.
Example 3.3 Consider the same LUPA with prize A = 4, bidding cost c = 1 as above, but
increase the number of players from three to seven. The unique symmetric equilibrium in this
game is













− π0 ≈ 0.00198,
π3 = 1 − π0 − π1 − π2 ≈ 0.0288,

















≈ 0.97 − 0.8327 = 0.1373,
π2 = 0,
π3 = 1 − π0 − π1 − π2 ≈ 0.03.
3.1 Equilibrium Distribution of Bids
















































In a preliminary analysis, we use the structure of the equilibrium, described in Proposition
3.1 as an approximation of the "true" equilibrium. Considering strategies with numbers t =
νk = 2k − 1. For these strategies , bid b is only placed in strategies with numbers νk ≥ 2b − 1.
Hence, bid b = 1 is placed in all strategies, which are played in equilibrium with positive
probabilities, except strategy s0.
The probability of bid b = 1 being placed in equilibrium is






Note that example 3.3 yields the same probability for the bid b = 1 both for the precise
and the approximated version of equilibrium.
Similarly, bid b = 2 is placed with probability












According to example 3.3, the probability of bid 2 being placed is q2 = π2+π3 ≈ 0.03078.





In general, a bid b is placed with probability















Figure 1 shows the shape of the probabilities of bids for varying number of participants
in a LUPA with A = 100 and c = 1.
4 Data and Comparison
124.1 Data description
The data for seven German LUPAs was provided by Legion Telekommunikation GmbH. Data
for other LUPAs is available online from AuctionAir Ltd..
For the German auctions, the following data about each bid are known (see Table 3):






Table 3. Registered Data
Bidders are identiﬁed by their telephone numbers. It is possible that one bidder uses sev-
eral telephone numbers or that several bidders form a coalition and bid from diﬀerent telephone
numbers. In ﬁrst case, the data would treat one player as two distinct bidders. In the second
case, the data would identify one coalition as several distinct bidders. B￿￿!#-D￿)￿￿￿!# ￿￿
￿￿. (2002) also note that in ﬁeld experiments conducted via mass media coalition formation
cannot be excluded. In some cases, one may suspect that coalitions were formed in a LUPA3,
but they seem to be extremely rare.
The bidding channel identiﬁes how a bid was placed. Diﬀerent LUPAs oﬀer diﬀerent
possibilities for placing a bid. Most auctions we analyze here were based on SMS or telephone
bidding. In some cases online bidding was also an option (then a registration was required to
enable billing through a telephone company). LUPAs organized by AuctionAirTM oﬀered only
online bidding with credit card payment. In this case, bidders are identiﬁed by invoice numbers.
One could place several bids with one invoice. If a bidder places bids through several invoices,
however, then it is hard to identify these invoices with an individual player.
The German LUPAs provide us with exact time and date of the bids. AuctionAirTM only
provides the date of the bid.
For the analysis in this paper we only use data about the bids. This information suﬃces
to derive the frequency of each bid from the bids of all players. This frequency distribution
is independent on the identiﬁcation of bidders, hence missing information cannot inﬂuence the
result.
3 For example, two diﬀerent players are suspected to build a coalition, if bidding from two diﬀerent telephone
numbers represents two complementing parts of one systemic strategy. Say, if bidder A places all bids from 1
to 1000, and bidder B places all bids from 1001 to 2000, we might suspect the two are in coalition. The winner of one
LUPA admitted in an interview after the game that she played in a coalition with a friend.
134.2 Number of Bidders versus Number of Players
In order to evaluate bidding behavior in the LUPAs, we ﬁrst need to estimate the number of
participants in the game. From the data we know only the number of bidders Nbid, which is
distinct from the number of players N since not to bid is a strategy. For a given number of













with the rest of players choosing strategy s0 of not participating in the bidding.
If we take the number of radio listeners as a proxy for the number of potential bidders,
we compute for a radio station with 800 000 listeners and a LUPA with a prize A = 10000€
and bidding costs c = 0,49€ the number of 10 active bidders. The actual number of bidders,
however, was close to 10000 persons!
On the other hand, if players do not follow the equilibrium structure derived in by Propo-
sition 3.1, the representation (9) is not true. Hence, it may be more reasonable to estimate the






This approach also hugely underestimation of the number of participants. For example,
in a LUPA with the prize of A = 10000€ and bidding costs c = 0,49€, the number of bids
b = 1 totalled 445 whereas the total number of bidders was 9400, and the total number of bids
was 47872. If each of 9400 bidders places bid b = 1 with probability q1, then the frequency of
bid b = 1 should average to 9400q1, which allows us to estimate q1 ≈ 0.04734. As a result, the




ln(1−0.04734) + 1 ≈ 253. This estimate
of the total number of players is almost forty times below the number of bidders, and would
only approach the actual number of bidders, if bid b = 1 were placed only by 12 bidders!
This suggests that we need another proxy for the number of players. In ﬁgures 2 - 5, we
use numbers Nbid, Nbid + 50% and Nbid − 50% as possible proxies.
It is interesting to note that the LUPA in Fig. 5 followed the one shown in Fig. 4 with
the same radio station just 3 days after the end of the latter. It seems that the experience of
players, who were informed about the results of the ﬁrst LUPA of the two in the series, changed
the distribution of frequencies, bringing it closer to our theoretical approximation.
4.3 Frequencies of bids



















































IPOD 20 GB Auction
Figure 2. Comparison of the model predictions and actual bidding behavior in an Auction with
20Gb iPod as a prize: Number of participants 95 (known to players), approximate price of the























































Figure 3. Comparison of the model predictions and actual bidding behavior in an Auction
with a 42" Plasma TV from LG as a prize: Number of participants 175 (known to players),


































































































































































Figure 5. LUPA Antenne Düsseldorf, 631 bidders, Prize 5000€, bidding costs 0,49€, duration
5 days.
prizes ranging from 1000€ to 5000€, and numbers of bidders between 437 and 916. The ﬁgure
reveals that the frequency distribution crucially depends on the value of the prize, but there
is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the frequencies between the LUPAs with monetary prizes and
commodity prizes of equal values. Note that in the newspaper LUPA the lower limit for bids
was set at the level of 1€, whereas in other auctions it was set on 0,01€. The auctions in Figure
6 were of diﬀerent duration, but the diﬀerences in frequency distributions may not be attributed
to the duration of the auction, as the following example shows.
In ﬁgure 7, two LUPAs with identical monetary prize of 10000€ and identical costs of0,49€
are compared. These two auctions were run by diﬀerent radio stations in two diﬀerent regions
of Germany. The ﬁrst auction ("RB" in the ﬁgure) had a bidding phase of 19 days, while
the bidding phase in the second auction ("AMV" in the ﬁgure) was only 8 days long. The
"RB"-auction took place 12 days after the end of the "AMV"-auction.
Although the bidding phase in the "AMV"-auction was shorter, it resulted in a slightly
higher number of bidders. The duration of the bidding phase itself does not seem to have a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence the resulting frequencies of bids.
The same conclusion appears to hold for two LUPAs with signiﬁcantly higher non-monetary
stakes, as shown in Figure 8. Both plots show bids below 100€ and corresponding absolute fre-
quencies in a range between 0 and 2000.
4.4 Strategies played in experiments
A symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium determines a probability distribution πt over the
pure strategies st. If the number of players who take part in the game is a large enough, then

























































































































































































































Figure 8. Frequencies of bids in LUPAs with extremely diﬀerent big stakes and diﬀerent duration
of the bidding phase.
For the approximate equilibrium of Proposition 3.1 the equilibrium strategies which are
played with positive probabilities have the property that placing a bid k implies also placing
the lower bid k −1. Accordingly, equilibrium bids should be systematically cover all bids up to
a certain level. If all players were to bid in this way, the frequency distribution over bids must
be a decreasing function.
Figure 9 shows the frequency distribution of bids in the interval from €10 to €20 in a
LUPA with about 10000 active participants and a the prize of €10000. The data reveals that
bidders do not seem to restrict their behavior to "systematic" bidding. For example, the share
of players, who place a bid on €11.11 is about 100 times higher then the share of players who
bid on €10.98. Similarly, the frequency of bids on €13.13 exceeds the frequency on €12.70.
Figure 10 shows the bids (horizontal axis) made by individual bidders (vertical axis) in
a LUPA with a mountain bike worth 1099€ as a prize in which 437 bidders took part. If
players would follow systemic strategies, the diagram should show solid horizontal bars. Figure
11 shows an enlargeemnt of the diagramp for bids from 1€ to 15€.; The circle on the vertical
axis indicates a bidder (with identiﬁcation number 372), who placed a total of 83 bids closely
covering the interval between 1€ and 2€.
Figure 9 reveals an interesting property of the frequency curve. A close-up of the frequency










































































































Figure 9. LUPA with prize 1000€, number of bidders 9400, bidding costs 0,49€, duration 17





















0 100 200 300 400 500
Bids
Figure 10. Strategic space: each bidder is uniquely identiﬁed by a point on the vertical axis
with dots in the plot identifying bids placed by this bidder.
Figure 11. Strategic space: bidders (vertical axis) and their bids (horizontal axis). A circle on


















































































































































Figure 12. "Close up" of the frequency curve from interval (0;20) to (1;10) and to (10;11) for
two similar LUPAs.
close-ups of the frequency curve. The shape of the curve is about the same no matter whether
it is considered at the interval from 0 to 20€, from 1€ to 10€ or from 10€ to 11€. This fractal
property of the frequency curve is diﬃcult to explain either by the game-theoretic model or by
random bidding.
A possible explanation of the spikes and of the fractal structure may be found in het-
erogeneity of agents. Figure 13 illustrates this idea. Suppose a group of players would bid for
some reason only above 1€, then we would observe a spike at the bid 100 (cents). A possible
justiﬁcation for not bidding below 1€ bids may be a conjecture that the number of rivals bidding
below 1€ is high enough to reduce the probability of winning with a bid below 100 cents to zero.
Such reasoning may lead players to "eliminate bids which are probably dominated". One might
call these players "super-rational", although this is incompatible with an equilibrium strategy.
It remains, however, unexplained why other "super rational" players would choose to take
the numbers 100, 200, 300, .. 1000 etc. as the lowest bound for their "reduced set of bids".
Even a theory of prominent numbers (A￿1￿￿￿ 1997) would not support this set of "prominent
numbers" since they cannot be reduced to the base of 1, 2, or 5.
5 Discussion





















Figure 13. Possible explanation for spikes in the frequency distribution: "super-rational" bid-
ders ﬁrst reduce the bidding interval, e.g. by making a guess that no bid below 1€ can win.
After that they bid as though the game would only allow bids higher than 1€.
mixed strategies. We have derived an approximation to a symmetric Nash equilibrium of these
LUPAs. Our model explains the downward slope of the bid distribution observed in the data,
and its dependence on the prize and bidding cost. However, the actual curvature of the bid
distribution deviates from the one predicted by the model. Partially this may be due to the
approximation used for the derivation of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game-theoretic
model.As Figures 4 and 5 suggest, however, that experience leads to a curvature which is closer
to the theoretical prediction. Moreover, a comparison of diﬀerent LUPAs with monetary and
non-monetary payoﬀs shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the aggregate behavior of players.
The data also reveals some other features, which may be hard to reconcile with any game-
theoretic model. For example, it seems unlikely that the fractal structure of the bid frequencies
can ﬁnd an explanation in the bid distribution of a Nash equilibrium. These features require
additional research both into the unconstrained bid distribution of a symmetric mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium and into alternative behavioral assumptions about the participants of these
auctions.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.2
I. c > A − 1 implies that pi (s) < 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀s1,..,si−1,si+1,..sm ∈ S, ∀si ∈ S : si ￿= ∅.
Obviously, s∗
1 = .. = s∗
m = ∅ is a Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies (NEPS) with pi (s∗) = 0,
∀i ∈ I. To prove uniqueness, assume s￿ is an equilibrium combination of strategies, where
at least one player i plays si ￿= s0 = ∅. Then for this player pi (s￿) < 0 = pi (s∗) where
s∗ : s∗
1 = .. = s∗
m = ∅. Hence, s￿ is not a NEPS.
II. c = A−1 implies there are no strategy combinations with strictly positive payoﬀs: for
21any player i any strategy si with |si| > 1 leads to pi (s) < 0 for any combination of other players’
strategies s−i, and are hence dominated by the trivial strategy, therefore they cannot be NEPS.
The strategies si = {b} (consisting only of one bid, |si| = 1) lead to strictly negative payoﬀs,
as soon as b > 1, for any combination of other players’ strategies s−i, and are also dominated
by the trivial strategy, therefore they cannot be NEPS. The set of strategies, which can lead
to an equilibrium is therefore reduced to S = {1}
)
∅. It is easy to check that a combination
s∗ : s∗
1 = .. = s∗






= ({1},∅), ∀i ∈ I is a





. The number of NEPS is m + 1.
III. c < A − 1 implies there exist strategy combinations with strictly positive payoﬀ of
one player. For example, a strategy combination s = (si,s−i) = ({1},∅), ∀i ∈ I leads to a
positive payoﬀ of the player i: pi (s) = A − 1 − c > 0. Therefore the strategy combination
s∗ : s∗
1 = .. = s∗
m = ∅is not a NEPS anymore (each player has incentives to deviate in favour



















= p−i (∅,{1}) = 0 ≥ p−i (s−i,{1})
for any other strategy s−i ∈ S. We have equality only if a player j plays s￿
j = {1;2}.
Any strategy combination s￿, where at least two players play {1} and all other players
play the trivial strategy, cannot be a NEPS since the set of unmatched bids is empty and the
payoﬀs of the players, who play {1}, is negative, which creates incentive for them to deviate in
favour of the trivial strategy.
Any strategy combination s￿￿, which contains strategies diﬀerent from {1} and ∅, cannot
be a NEPS since either such strategies contain a bid b ≥ 2, or their length is strictly greater
than one, which both induce negative payoﬀ and hence create incentives to deviate in favour of
the trivial strategy.






= ({1},∅) are the only NEPS. The
number of such combinations is m.
IV. c ￿ A
2 − 1. First, note that s∗
1 = .. = s∗
m = ∅ is not a NEPS since each player
has incentives to deviate in favour of a strategy with positive payoﬀ. A strategy combination
without winner cannot be a NEPS (as above).
Assume s∗ = (s∗
1,..s∗
m) is a NEPS, and the player i wins. This implies that the strategies
played by all other players are trivial: s∗
j = ∅, ∀j ∈ I : j ￿= i (if this would not be the case, it
would imply that some players who loose, obtain negative payoﬀ and hence have incentive to
deviate in favour of the trivial strategy, which contradicts to the assumption that s∗ is a NEPS).
This implies that s∗
i = {1}, as this is the strategy with maximum payoﬀ (otherwise the player
22i has incentive to deviate in favour of {1}, which would contradict to the assumption that s∗
is a NEPS). This implies that if a player j ￿= i plays a strategy s￿
j = {1,2}, he can become a
winner with the winning bid b = 2. This deviation is only proﬁtable compared to the initial
strategy s∗
j = ∅ if pj = A−2−2c > 0. As soon as c ≥ A
2 −1, no player j would have incentives







a NEPS. Otherwise any player j ￿= i has an incentive to deviate from the strategy s∗
j = ∅ in
favour of the strategy s￿
j = {1,2}. This is a contradiction to the assumption that s∗ is a NEPS.
Therefore no NEPS can exist if c < A
2 − 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.3

























































































does not depend on si and equals to unity, for it describes
the probability of reaching any of strategy combinations in a subgame determined by a given
strategy si of player i.
Now we have to determine the expected prize of player i:
￿
s∈SN
















πj (sj)(A − k)




























sj (l) ￿= 1,∀l < k
0 otherwise










(1 − sh (k)) = 1, therefore we can choose the latter to be ρ(s,k).
With regards to ψ(s,k), note that for any strategy combination s and for any bid l, the
above function ρ(s,l) only delivers unity if
N ￿
j=1
sj (l) = 1, and is zero otherwise. The term
k−1 ￿
l=1
(1 − ρ(s,l)) is then unity only if no l < k is placed exactly once in a given strategy combi-











(1 − sh (l))


Proof of Proposition 3.1
To prove that π∗ is an equilibrium, assume that each rival of player i plays the mixed
strategy from π∗. Starting from this point, we show that if player i also plays the same mixed
strategy, he has no incentives to deviate from it.
First, consider the probability of playing s1. Player i chooses π1
i to maximize his expected
payoﬀ Pi (πi,π−i). The marginal payoﬀ is independent of π2
i..π2b−1
i , due to the linearity of the
payoﬀ function. Since other players only play sνk with positive probabilities, there is only one
strategy combination s−i played with positive probability, in which si = s1 wins A, namely
if all other players play s0. In all other strategy combinations either some other player plays
a strategy, which includes bid "1", and hence strategy si = s1 cannot win, or the strategy
combination includes strategies, which are played with zero probability, and hence the whole
strategy combination is played with zero probability. The combination of mixed strategies π∗
−i













= 1, is s−i =
￿
s0..s0￿
and it is played with probability
￿
π0￿N−1. The choice of










= (A − 1)
￿
π0￿N−1 − c = 0 (A-3)
The ﬁrst order condition A-3 is derived from the payoﬀ function of player i using the
fact, that the boolean functions ψ and ρ are only unity for the strategy combination, in which
all other players play s0. Condition A-3 implies that player i is indiﬀerent with regards to
probability π1
i of playing s1. In other words, player i cannot be better oﬀ if he deviates from
playing π1
i = π∗ ￿
s1￿
.
In a similar way, FOC for πνk
i is met if strategies sν0..sνk−1 are played with probabilities
given by π∗. For each bid l = 1..k in strategy sνk, we need to determine strategy combinations
s−i, for which ρ((sνk,s−i),l) · ψ((sνk,s−i),l) = 1. These are strategy combinations, in which
player i would win with bid l. All other strategy combinations enter the expected payoﬀ function
with zero weight.
Let us denote with Sl
−i the set of strategy combinations s−i of the rivals of i, in which
player i can win with any bid m = 1..l. Since all N − 1 rivals of i play mixed strategy
combination π∗
−i, we can calculate the cumulative probability of all strategy combinations,










these strategy combinations we are only interested in those combinations, in which only bid
m = l wins. In terms of sets of strategy combinations, we are looking for strategy combinations
s−i ∈ Sl
−i\Sl−1















of player’s i rivals’ playing strategy
combinations, in which player i can win with some lower bid m = 1..l − 1. Therefore, for any





, then player i wins with bid 1. In this notation s
ν0 = s




















N −1 times, since any of N −1 players can choose to play s
νk, whereas other players play s
0. Hence, we need to
count for all possible ways, in which N−1 players can choose among l distinct strategies s
ν0..s
νl so that n0of players
play s
ν0, n1of players play s
ν1, and so on. Obviously,
￿l
h=1 nh = N − 1 (the sum of numbers
of players who play strategy s
νh over all strategies is equal to the total number of players under consideration). The



















nl. Using the multinomial





















The discussion above guarantees that the right-hand side counts for those strategy combi-
nations, in which ρ((si,s−i),l)ψ((si,s−i),l) = 1. We do not need to count for the rest of them,
since ρ((si,s−i),l)ψ((si,s−i),l) is a boolean function and it equals zero if not equal unity.
The marginal expected payoﬀ of player i from playing strategy sνk with probability πνk
i





















 − kc (A-4)






Again, player i is indiﬀerent with regards to πνk
i , and deviating from πνk
i = π∗ (sνk) does
not make player i better oﬀ.
Choosing πνk
i iteratively, player i approaches strategy sνM such that setting πνM
i in ac-
cordance with the formula for πνk




i > 1. The ﬁrst order condition A-4
for πνM
i is met by the choice of π∗
−i for strategies sν0..sνM−1, hence if player i plays πνM
i with




i = 1, he is still in his optimum.
Solution to Example 3.1
Consider players i and j playing a two-players LUPA with the prize of 4 and marginal
costs of 1. Obviously, strategies with bids b > 3 are strictly dominated by the non-entrance
strategy. Expected payoﬀ function is in this case
Pi (πi,π−i) = 3
￿
s∈SN




πi (si)si(2)πj (sj)ρ(s,k)ψ(s,k) +
￿
s∈SN







The strategy set of each player consists of eight strategies s0..s7, following the notation from
the beginning of the paper. There are in total 82 = 64 strategy combinations.
The ﬁrst summation operator only includes those strategy combinations, in which player
26i places bid 1, otherwise si(1) = 0. These are all strategy combinations within which player i
plays strategies s1 = (1,0,0),s3 = (1,1,0), s5 = (1,0,1), s7 = (1,1,1). The boolean function
ρ(s,1) = si (1)(1 − sj (1)) + sj (1)(1 − si (1)) = 1 − sj (1) only delivers unity if player j plays
strategies with even numbers: s0 = (0,0,0),s2 = (0,1,0), s4 = (0,0,1), s6 = (0,1,1). The











The second summation operator only includes strategy combinations, in which player i
places bid b = 2, i.e. those with player’s i strategies s2 = (0,1,0), s3 = (1,1,0), s6 = (0,1,1),
s7 = (1,1,1). The boolean function ρ(s,2) = 1 − sj (2) only delivers unity for following strate-
gies played by player j: s0 = (0,0,0),s1 = (1,0,0), s4 = (0,0,1), s5 = (1,0,1). The boolean




























































The third summation operator only includes strategy combinations, consisting of s4 =
(0,0,1), s5 = (1,0,1), s6 = (0,1,1), s7 = (1,1,1) for player i, and of s0 = (0,0,0), s1 = (1,0,0),
s2 = (0,1,0), s3 = (1,1,0) for player j. Among these strategy combinations, function
ψ(s,3) = (1 − si (1)(1 − sj (1)) − sj (1)(1 − si (1))) ×
(1 − si (2)(1 − sj (2)) − sj (2)(1 − si (2)))
































Summarizing, the expected payoﬀ function for player i may be written as








































27Rearranging leads to the following payoﬀ matrix (only payoﬀs for player i are shown,
symmetric for j):
i \ j s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
s0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s1 2 −1 2 −1 2 −1 2 −1
s2 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1
s3 1 0 1 −2 1 0 1 −2
s4 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
s5 1 −1 1 −2 1 −2 1 −2
s6 0 −2 −1 −2 0 −2 −2 −2
s7 0 −1 0 −2 0 −1 0 −3

















































































j − 1, ∀t = 0..3 (A-6)
It immediately follows that in an equilibrium, in which player j plays the ﬁrst four strate-
gies with πt




i = 0. Indeed, either ∂Pi
∂πt
i > 0 and
πt
i = 1, which implies all other probabilities to be zero, or ∂Pi
∂πt







If player j plays π0
j = 1, then it is optimal for player i to play π1
i = 1. If player j plays
π1
j = 1, all derivatives in (A-5) turn negative, except ∂Pi
∂π3
i = 0. Therefore, it is still optimal
for player i to play π0
i = 0. At the same time, player i is indiﬀerent between strategies s0 and
s3, since both respective marginal payoﬀs are zero. Player i can choose π3
i > 0, respecting the
constraint π0
i + π3
i = 1, but π0
i cannot be smaller than 1
3, since otherwise π1
j = 1 is not optimal
for player j anymore. This reasoning leads to two connected continua of equilibria
NE1 πi = (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) πj = (α,0,0,1 − α,0,0,0,0)







There are no other equilibria with some player playing a pure strategy. For equilibria





j = 0 and for π0
j = 1 − π1
j − π2
j − π3
j in (A-5) yields
∂Pi
∂π1














j − 1 ≤ 0










i = 0, which implies
∂Pj
∂π3
j < 0, and hence π3
j = 0. In this case in order to meet the
ﬁrst condition, π1
j should satisfy 2 − 3π1
j ≤ 1 − 2π1
j, which is equivalent to π1
j ≥ 1. Since pure





i < 0 and π3
i = 0, therefore
∂Pj
∂π1
j = 2 − 3π1
i ≤ 0 implies π1
i ≥ 2
3, which is
only possible if ∂Pi
∂π1













i −1 = 0 implying
∂Pj
∂π1
j < 0, and hence π1
j = 0. This implies 2
3 −π3
j ≤ π1
j = 0 i.e.
π3
j ≥ 2
3 and in turn ∂Pi
∂π1
i < 0, which is a contradiction to π1
i ≥ 2
3.
Therefore, in equilibrium π1
j = 1




j, which is zero only if
π2
j = π3
j = 0. The latter implies ∂Pi
∂π1
i > 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, ∂Pi
∂π2
i < 0 and
hence π2
i = 0.








j. The two cannot be nega-





i = 0, which implies π3
j = 1
6. The rest is easy to calculate. Besides the
above asymmetric equilibria with pure strategies, the game has a unique equilibrium in mixed




















3, bid b = 2 is placed with probability 1
6, no other bids are placed.
Both players face an expected payoﬀ of zero
End of solution
Solution to Example 3.2
Let three players i, j and y play LUPA with the prize of 4, and bidding costs of 1. Again,
consider only bids up to b = 3. Each player may randomize over 8 strategies. Set SN consists of
512 strategy combinations s. Some asymmetric equilibria can be found by noticing that if one
of the players doesn’t enter the game, other players play the game from the previous example
with respective equilibria, in which one of the players plays strategy s1 with certainty. The
third player has no incentives to enter the game.
29>From now on we focus on symmetric equilibria in mixed strategies. The marginal ex-














































































Since pure strategies are not possible in the symmetric equilibrium, ∂Pi
∂πt
i ≤ 0, ∀t = 0..7.
First note that as soon as no strategy is played in equilibrium as a pure strategy, we










π0 + π1 + π2 + π3￿2 ≤ 1
which implies ∂Pi
∂π4
i < 0. Therefore, π4
i = 0 in equilibrium. The same reasoning applies to
￿￿






π0 + π1 + π2 + π3￿2 ≤ 1
and
￿￿






π0 + π1 + π2 + π3￿2 ≤ 1
and
￿





π0 + π1 + π2 + π3￿2 ≤ 1
which lead to ∂Pi
∂π5
i < 0, ∂Pi
∂π6
i < 0 and ∂Pi
∂π7
i < 0 and therefore to π5
i = 0, π6




i ≤ 0, ∂Pi
∂π2
i ≤ 0 and ∂Pi
∂π3


























i < 0 then π1 = 0. At the same time π3 = 0, and π0 + π2 = 1 should hold , which
makes ∂Pi
∂π1
i strictly positive, which is a contradiction.
If ∂Pi
∂π2





2. At the same time, ∂Pi
∂π1
i = 0 implies
π0 = 1 √
3, hence π1 < 1 √
6 and therefore π3 = 1 − π0 − π1 > 1 − 1 √
3 − 1 √





= 1. Substituting for π0 = 1 √
3 yields
￿
π1￿2 + 2 √
3π1 − 1
2 = 0. This equation















































i = 0 and ∂Pi
∂π1
i = 0 together with ∂Pi
∂π3
i < 0 then we obtain
￿









π0 + π1 + π2 = 1
the ﬁrst and the third equations yield π1 = 1 − 1 √




















since 6 < 1 + 4
√
3.



























The expected payoﬀ of players in the symmetric equilibrium is zero
End of solution
Solution to Example 3.3











π0 + π1￿6 − 6π1 ￿
π0￿5￿







π0 + π1￿6 −
￿
π0￿6￿




i < 0 we obtain π1 = 0, which implies π3 = 0, hence π0 + π2 = 1, which
implies ∂Pi
∂π1





i < 0 and ∂Pi
∂π3

















i > 0, which is a contradiction.
∂Pi
∂π2
i = 0 and ∂Pi
∂π3
i < 0 imply π3 = 0, hence π0 + π2 = 1 − π1, which turns ∂Pi
∂π1
i = 0
























i < 0 (since π0 < 1 < 6π1), which is also a contradiction.











i ). Condition ∂Pi
∂π2

















76−66. Probability π3 is determined by the condition
3 ￿
k=0
πk = 1. It
31is easy to prove that all probabilities are strictly positive.
End of solution
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